Click here for original article from "Politka."
.gif)
Firstly, what is the purpose of being part of the collective security system? Who is the enemy of this system of collective security from which Serbia would be defended? Who exactly is the enemy? It is difficult to identify the enemy in the Balkans or in the vicinity, which is in a position to threaten or would Serbia have interest in it. Moreover, even if there are such enemies, whether NATO really committed to the defense of Serbia? Article 5 of the Agreement on NATO says that an attack on one member is an attack on all NATO members. But there is nothing in the 5th Article which requires a member to come to the aid of another. For example, suppose that Georgia was a member of NATO in the summer of 2008. Does anyone really believe that U.S. and NATO would have gone to war with Russia over Georgia? It is incredible!
Secondly, the Serbs must understand that NATO membership really means that Serbia will be expected to conform their security needs of the most powerful members, especially that of the United States. This means that as a member of NATO, Serbia will be under pressure to join the U.S. in military adventures that have little to do with the interests and its own security. Of course, Belgrade would not be obliged to comply, but pressure would be greater and more frequent when she becomes a member of the alliance.
Thirdly, NATO as a force is in the decline. It was built to meet specific threats between 1949 and 1989. When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union disintegrated, the need for NATO has declined rapidly. Western military alliance was a real instrument to confront the Soviet threat, but the threat is no longer, and the architect of NATO has not been able to reconstruct the alliance as a viable instrument in the modern world. In fact, the existence of NATO is not much more than the extension of the Cold War division of Europe into the 21st century. Russia is out of this and will never be brought in, the "club." Also, there is almost no value outside the country. In Iraq, the alliance the was not useful, and in Afghanistan is of very little combat use. NATO was good for 1960, but not 2010!
Fourth, Serbia would not save money by serving special role or as special forces in NATO. Depending on which side would be selected for the role of Serbia, the price could be even higher than maintenance for a robust military capability. Even if membership in NATO would bring savings, would it be worth the membership if the Serbian position would not serve the security interests of Serbia? Serbian security interests lie primarily in the south, not to be a servant of the U.S. as an assistant in a place like Afghanistan. In addition, as a member of NATO, Serbia would be under pressure to buy equipment from NATO partners, regardless of whether it is needed.
At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Serbia must put forth three questions:
First, what is the nature of the new security landscape?
Second, what are the interests of Serbia in this new environment?
Third, what policies and instruments are required for Serbia to protect and promote her interests?
Frankly considering these issues, the Serbs should face the fact that their interests do not lie only in the West, but are now in Russia, China, Iran, Brazil and many other places. In the modern world security can no longer be defined solely in terms of military interest, but it should be understood in terms of energy, food, environmental and human security. But doesn't this reality require more than membership in NATO? Of course, Serbia should seek EU membership, but not at the expense of relations in many other directions.
University Professor, Washington
