Is Russia good for Serbia?

Is Russia good for Serbia? I have heard numerous Serbs ask this question often. Throughout history, Serbs have looked on "Mother Russia" as a glimmer of hope during the numerous occasions when the smaller Serb nation was up against seemingly impossible odds. In those times, Serbs would say: "Nas i Rusa trista miliona," or translating to: "We and the Russians are three hundred million." Following some disappointment with a Russia during the 1990's which was overwhelmed with her own problems, some Serbs would add to the saying with some cynicism: "…if only Mother Russia realized that her child was Serbia." Even recently, when it seemed Serbia would for sure lose its province Kosovo-Metohija, Russia has managed to delay the independence process for the province offering at least some hope. Now Serbs are again asking: "Is Russia good for Serbia?

Before I answer this question I wish to point out that Russian and Serb relations have existed for centuries. How much this relationship has benefited the Serb people in my view, has varied throughout history due to various circumstances connected to the geopolitical situation of the moment. Therefore I wish to focus for the time being on more recent events.

Most people who follow recent Balkan history will not argue that the Russian Federation during the 1990's under President Yeltsin was capable of standing up to the Trans-atlantic forces that were reshaping Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, most people may not be aware of the important role the Russian military played in stopping the complete destruction of Serbia after the Dayton Peace accords that allowed NATO's occupation of Bosnia Herzegovina which includes the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska).

After Dayton, NATO divided Bosnia Herzegovina into three sectors: British, French, and U.S. Divisions. Each sector included both NATO and non-NATO members as "multinational divisions" which comprised the "Implementation Force" (IFOR), and later the "Stabilization Force (SFOR). The U.S. sector set up its head quarters in Tuzla, which is located on the Muslim dominated "Federation" territory. Within the U.S. sector, various countries occupied specific areas based on negotiations that led up to the Dayton Peace Accords. For example, it was no coincidence, that the bulk of the U.S. forces operated in and around Tuzla, were put there because the local population there had welcomed the U.S. forces. While based among Muslims that were thought to be more moderate, U.S. forces could safely stage patrols from this area into Republika Srpska to directly provide security for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for other missions. Elsewhere, a Turkish Brigade was assigned to the Zenica area of the Federation territory. Also a Muslim area, Zenica was home to foreign Islamic extremists including Al-Qaida and militant paramilitary units that are still operating there often in plain view. This arrangement may have reduced the risk of exposure to Islamic militants which could target U.S. troops. Furthermore, the Muslim population around Zenica most likely realized that a secular Muslim Turkish military presence would deal with any radical elements with brutality if provoked.

What was also significant to this arrangement was the location of the area of responsibility for the "Separate Russian Brigade." Composed of elite volunteers from Russian Airborne Assault units, these units occupied the main avenues of approach leading to Serbia Proper's underbelly from the U.S. Sector. Russian units likewise were mostly garrisoned in Serb areas reducing the possibility of their soldiers being exposed to hostile Muslim forces. For the most part, the member nations involved during the enforcement of the Dayton Agreement cooperated under their U.S. command within the U.S. Sector. It was not unusual for Russian and U.S. soldiers to be seen on joint patrols and other military operations. On one occasion, the U.S. Division even put a U.S. Battalion Task Force under the Russian Brigade Command temporarily after the Russians requested additional troops for a particular mission. Whereas the Russian and other International forces in the U.S. Sector operated under U.S. command during conventional operations, Russians were required to follow their own Rules of Engagement (ROE) when dealing with the warring factions. This meant that Moscow would not allow them to fire on Serb units unless they were attacked. The Russians also differed on enforcement of the Dayton Accord, and on numerous occasions refused to act against the Serbs.

By 1998, the U.S. Command was already planning possible contingencies for a possible NATO attack on Yugoslavia as fighting escalated between Albanian insurgents and the Serbian government forces. This development initiated military planners in Tuzla to draw up contingencies plans. Possible scenarios could be Yugoslav or Serb forces deciding to attack the U.S. command base in Tuzla or other NATO base camps, and/or should NATO decision makers decide to include NATO forces already forward deployed in Bosnia to launch a ground war invasion to seize Belgrade.

Launching a ground invasion into Yugoslavia through mountainous terrain from neighboring Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) or Albanian territory would pose a challenge. Ideally, the heavily armed mechanized combat teams comprised of U.S. Abrams Main Battle Tanks and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles could easily take off from bases around Tuzla towards Belgrade. The main road to Belgrade from Tuzla is only 200 km passing through Bijeljina. This avenue of approach would offer NATO an unhindered movement of vehicles as an advantage over Serb forces defending Belgrade. From Tuzla, these mechanized units could theoretically arrive in Belgrade within a matter of hours under the cover of NATO air suppression. But in reality, the planners were frustrated because the Russian Airborne units occupied all the avenues approach and the they were not going to allow U.S. or NATO forces through its territory to attack Serbia.

On March 24, 1999, NATO began its air attack on Yugoslavia after Belgrade refused to sign the Rambolleit Agreement. This agreement proposed by the U.S. contained text which would allow NATO forces unhindered access to occupy all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which included Serbia. Despite predictions that Belgrade would capitulate after a few days of bombing, Serbian forces stubbornly resisted the NATO air strikes with tenacity. Speculations of a NATO or U.S. led ground invasion also evaporated since the 50,000 force of U.S. light airborne troops based in nearby FYROM would have to slug onward through mountainous terrain against 40,000 dug in Yugoslav Army troops and possibly tens of thousands of additional Serbian paramilitary forces providing guerilla resistance. When a cease fire was agreed upon after 78 days of bombing, a small contingent of Russian armored BTR vehicles drove from their base in Ugljevik, Bosnia (Republika Srpska) via Belgrade to Pristina provoking NATO forces before they could enter the Kosovo province nearly risking war between Russia and NATO.

It is no secret Milosevic caved in to NATO demands during the bombing from diplomatic pressure from Moscow, but other reports suggest that in addition to weapons and technical know how, the Russians provided intelligence to the Military of Yugoslavia throughout the war. Despite the weakness of the Kremlin to confront NATO directly, it is in my view that it was the maneuvering and negotiations of the Russian military forces that enabled the Serbs to deny NATO a quick victory in Yugoslavia and thus providing Belgrade the leverage to force NATO to compromise on its demand to occupy the entire territory of Yugoslavia. Likewise, NATO could not count on full victory either without risking a wider and unwanted war with a nuclear armed Russia over the Russian military's strategic positions in Bosnia and their race to enter Kosovo first. Thus the Russian contingent within the NATO occupation successfully denied U.S. and NATO planners the opportunity to move in on Belgrade with force and inevitably to occupy Serbia as according to their original demands at Rambolleit. - TRP